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Abstract 
 
We explore the potential drivers of corporate capital-structure decision. We apply both fixed 
effects panel models and random effects tobit models to examine this issue. Based on a 
sample of 379 firms across the period from 1991 to 2002, we find that corporate 
characteristics (firm size, firm risk, firm growth rate, firm profitability and asset tangibility) 
and corporate governance characteristics (board size and outside directorships) are the main 
drivers of capital-structure of UK firms. In addition, our results show that changing the 
definition of capital-structure may result in changing the sign and the significance of these 
potential drivers. Hence, we argue that another dimension of the capital-structure puzzle can 
be introduced, which is related to the definition of capital-structure used in prior studies. It is 
worth noting that our aim is not to provide an optimal set of factors that may affect the 
decision of capital-structure, but to highlight the effect of the different definitions of capital-
structure that can be used by different studies, which makes comparison between such studies 
difficult or even erroneous.  
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1. Introduction 
A substantial literature on accounting and finance has undertaken to identify what drives one 
of the key corporate financial policies, the capital-structure decision. The study by Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) was the first to examine this issue. They offered evidence that capital-
structure is unrelated to the value of a firm. Five years later, the same authors relaxed the 
prefect market assumptions and added corporate taxes in their models (Modigliani and Miller, 
1963). Consequently, they found that the value of a firm will be enhanced if the level of debt 
increases. They elucidated their findings by the fact that interest paid is tax-deductible and 
hence firms would enjoy a debt tax shield when funding their activities by long-term debt. 
However, Modigliani and Miller (1963) did not take into account bankruptcy-related costs. 
The findings in Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) encouraged many researchers to explore 
further the drivers of corporate capital-structure decisions. Until now, there has been no 
general agreement about the capital-structure debate. As a result, it is still unclear what drives 
capital-structure decisions. 
Early literature on the capital-structure puzzle by Myers (1984) examined different 
capital-structure theories. He found that drivers of firms’ decisions to choose debt, equity or 
hybrid securities are still unknown. The findings in Myers’s article challenged researchers to 
explore this puzzle further. Berens and Cuny (1995: 1185) revisited this puzzle and find that 
“debt ratios provide an inappropriate framework for empirically examining the trade-off 
theory of capital-structure”. In particular, they explained that debt (or debt-to-equity) ratios 
are misguided and lead to poor and inconsistent results when examining the determinants of 
corporate capital-structure. In their recent article, Barclay and Smith (2005) revisited the 
capital-structure puzzle and concluded that different capital-structure theories lead to 
different and diametrically opposed decisions and outcomes. 
 4 
The above mentioned papers concentrated only on identifying the firm-specific 
factors that might affect corporate decision of capital-structure choice, while ignoring 
corporate governance factors. However, prior research provided evidence that corporate 
governance mechanisms affect corporate capital-structure decisions (Wen et al., 2002; Du 
and Dia, 2005; La Rocca, 2007; Driffield et al., 2007; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009). 
Therefore, a significant feature of this paper is its importance in providing novel contribution 
to the literature of corporate capital-structure. To the best of our knowledge, this paper 
uniquely examines the capital-structure puzzle in the UK by applying both panel models and 
tobit-panel models. Moreover, it is the first paper to include corporate governance factors and 
firm characteristics when examining the capital-structure puzzle. It is worth noting that our 
aim is not to provide an optimal set of factors that may affect the capital-structure decision, 
but to highlight the effect of the different definitions of capital-structure used by prior 
research, which makes comparison between such studies difficult or even erroneous.  
The results show that corporate characteristics, including firm size, business risk, 
growth rate, profitability and asset tangibility, have an impact on firms’ capital-structure. 
Corporate governance characteristics, including board size and outside directorships, also 
have an effect on firms’ capital-structure. Moreover, we argue that another dimension of the 
capital-structure puzzle can be introduced, which is related to the definition of capital-
structure used in prior studies. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research on the determinants 
of capital-structure and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research 
method and data description. The main regression results are presented in Section 4.  Finally, 
Section 5 concludes and suggests areas for future research. 
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2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
This section reviews relevant empirical studies that examine the extent to which firm 
characteristics affect the capital-structure decision. A pioneering research article on the 
determinants of capital-structure was by Titman and Wessels (1988). The authors provided 
evidence that the size of a firm and its profitability are negatively related to corporate capital-
structure, while asset tangibility is positively related to corporate capital-structure. In the 
same fashion, but using international data, Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated the capital-
structure debate in G7 countries. The authors found that market-to-book ratio and 
profitability have a negative impact on firms’ capital-structure, while asset tangibility and 
firm size have a positive impact on firms’ capital-structure. Ozkan (2001) found that profit, 
liquidity, non-debt tax shield and growth opportunities are negatively related to capital-
structure. In addition, he found limited support for a positive relationship between firm size 
and capital-structure.  
Delcoure (2007) explored the drivers of capital-structure choice in a sample of Central 
and Eastern European countries. Delcoure’s study showed that asset tangibility has a positive 
effect on firms’ capital-structure. The study also showed a negative relationship between 
profitability and the decision of capital-structure. Other firms’ characteristics were used in 
prior research as determinants of corporate capital-structure. These include asset uniqueness 
(i.e. Wen et al., 2002) and firm risk (Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009). However, the authors 
did not find the exact hypothesised relationship between asset uniqueness and/or firm risk 
and corporate capital-structure decision.  
The following six research hypotheses are set for the firm-specific effect. These are 
formulated as follows: 
H1: There is a relationship between profitability and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
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H2: There is a relationship between business risk and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
H3: There is a relationship between asset tangibility and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
H4: There is a negative relationship between the growth rate and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
H5: There is a relationship between firm size and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
H6: There is a relationship between asset uniqueness and the debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
Similarly, prior research (for example, Mehran, 1992; Berger et al., 1997; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Wen et al., 2002; Du and Dia, 2005; Abor and Biekpe, 2005; Al-
Najjar and Hussainey, 2009) found that corporate capital-structure decision is also influenced 
by corporate governance factors. In particular, Mehran (1992), Berger et al. (1997) and Abor 
and Biekpe (2005) found a significant negative association between the size of the board of 
directors and debt-to-equity ratios. However, Jensen (1986) found a positive association 
between higher debt ratios and larger board size. Other researchers (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Wen et al., 2002; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009) found that there is no significant 
association between board size and debt-to-equity ratios.  
Additionally, Abor and Biekpe (2005) showed positive relationships between capital-
structure and board composition (% of outside directors), while Wen et al. (2002) found a 
negative association between outside directors and capital-structure. However, Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey (2009) found no association between the two variables.  
Finally, Wiwattanakantang (1999) found that managerial shareholdings have 
consistent positive influence on family-owned firm leverage. Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) 
found that insider ownership is the main corporate governance factor affecting firms’ capital-
structure. 
 Given the above mixed results, we also revisit this research area and examine the 
association between corporate governance and capital-structure. In particular, we set the 
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following three research hypotheses for the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
firms’ capital-structure decision. These are formulated as follows: 
H7: There is a relationship between insider ownership and debt-to-equity ratio. 
H8: There is a negative relationship between outside directorship and debt-to-equity ratio. 
H9: There is a negative relationship between board size and debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
Finally, we examine the extent to which firm characteristics and corporate governance 
factors are equal across capital-structure models. To examine this research issue, we use 
panel models and random effects tobit models. We also use three different definitions of 
capital-structure; namely, long term debt-to-equity ratio, debt-to-capital ratio and debt-to-
equity ratio, and hypothesise that each determinant has the same effect across the capital-
structure models. 
 
3. Empirical Tests 
In this paper, we use a panel fixed effects regression model to investigate the determinants of 
capital-structure for a sample of 379 non-financial UK firms for the period from 1991 to 
2002. The study investigates the following model: 
                     itLev =    +   itX + it              
Where the dependent variable ( itLev ) is (long term debt-to-equity ratio, debt-to-capital ratio 
and debt-to-equity ratio).  is the intercept.   is the row vector of slope coefficients of 
regressors. itX  is the column vector of financial variables for firm i at time t; this vector is 
made up of the following: ROCE (Return on Capital Employed); BETA (Risk for the Firm); 
TANG (Fixed Assets Ratio); MB (Market-to-Book Ratio); FIRM SIZE (The Natural 
Logarithm of the Total Assets); ASSET UNIQUENESS (Research and Development 
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divided by Sales); CHS (Closely Held Shares); Number of Non-executive Directors on 
Board and Board of Directors Size. it  is the  Residual Error for Firm i at Year t. 
It is also worth noting that we used the tobit models to check the robustness of our 
models. The formula of the tobit model is expressed by the following equation:  





 
otherwise                                                   0    =       
0 >side hand-right  theif                                 + X + = Lev ititit 
                     
 
Where itLev  is (long term debt-to-equity ratio, debt-to-capital ratio and debt-to-equity ratio), 
and  itX  is the column vector of financial variables as defined above.  
3.1 Sample Selection 
The sample is an updated version of the ICCSR UK Environmental & Financial Dataset, 
which contains information for UK firms from 1991 to 2002.
2
  Financial firms are excluded 
from the analyses. The sample also excludes any firms with no financial and accounting 
records on Datastream or Worldscope. This provides a final sample of 379 non-financial 
firms for the period from 1991 to 2002 inclusive.  
3.2 Measurement of variables  
Our capital-structure measures are collected from Datastream. Long term debt-to-equity ratio 
is the total loans divided by equity capital and reserves minus total intangibles (Datastream 
item 733). Debt-to-capital ratio is preference capital plus total debt divided by total capital 
employed plus short term borrowing minus total intangibles (Datastream item 731). Debt-to-
equity ratio is calculated as total debts divided by total equity capital and reserves. 
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Our profitability measure is return on capital employed (Datastream item 707), which 
is defined as earnings before interest and tax divided by total capital employed plus short 
term borrowings minus total intangibles. Business risk measure is beta calculated from 
Datastream. Asset tangibility is the percentage of fixed assets to total assets. Fixed assets 
variable is calculated by the difference between total assets (Datastream item 392) and 
current assets (Datastream item 376). Market-to-book value is the price divided by the book 
value or net tangible assets per share for the appropriate financial year end, adjusted for 
capital changes (Dastastream item (PTBV). Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
This represents the sum of tangible fixed assets, intangible assets investment (including 
associates), other assets, total stocks and WIP, total debtors and equivalent, and cash 
equivalents (Datastream item 392). Uniqueness variable is research and development 
(Datastream item 119) divided by total sales (Datastream item 104). The percentage of a 
firm’s common stock held by insiders as a proxy for insider power is calculated from 
Worldscope (Worldscope item 08021). NEXDR represents the number of board directors 
employed in non-executive roles (Datastream item 243). DRCTR is the number of executive 
and non-executive directors on the board (Datastream item 242). 
 
4. Results  
In the regression analysis we used three definitions for capital-structure: long term debt-to-
equity ratio, debt-to-capital ratio and debt-to-equity ratio. The reason behind using three 
definitions is to see if the investigated variables will have the same results across the three 
definitions of capital-structure. In other words, we aim to study the capital-structure puzzle 
by investigating whether changing the definition of capital-structure will result in changing 
the overall interpretation of the theory. 
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Table 1 shows the long term capital-structure (debt-to-equity) model. The results 
show that there is a negative relationship between capital-structure and asset tangibility. This 
result contradicts the positive expected sign in prior research, in which fixed assets can be 
considered as collaterals. However, this result may be due to the fact that managers are averse 
to bankruptcy because of its negative impact on their compensation plans and job security. 
Therefore, firms with lower tangible assets may tend to use more debt to control managerial 
activity regardless of the cost of issuing debt. Hence, there is a trade-off between agency 
costs and cost of debt, and thus we expect a negative relationship between capital-structure 
and tangible assets (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Bhaduri, 2002).  
The results also show a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
capital-structure. This result contradicts the agency theory, which expects a negative sign 
between capital-structure and growth opportunities. However, we can explain this positive 
sign drawing on the fact that high growth UK firms tend to rely on debt financing to pay for 
their investment opportunities. Another explanation is that these firms have a lower chance of 
financial distress and hence they can more easily access to debt financing than do low growth 
firms. This result is consistent with Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) and Bhaduri (2002). 
Furthermore, there is a positive relationship between firm size and capital-structure. This 
result is consistent with transaction cost theory which indicates that large firms tend to be 
more diversified and have more access to debt financing. Finally, the results show that there 
is a positive relationship between non-executive directors and capital-structure. This is 
consistent with Abor and Biekpe (2005). This suggests that UK firms with more non-
executive directors on the board of directors are likely to have easier access to credit and 
consequently pursue high debt policy (Abor and Biekpe, 2005). However, this finding is not 
consistent with other empirical findings (i.e. Wen et al., 2002).  
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Based on the results in Table 1, the use of long term debt-to-equity ratio model leads 
us to accept H3; H4; H5 and H8. We cannot find empirical support for profitability, firm risk, 
asset uniqueness, insider ownership and board size. As a result, we reject H1; H2; H6; H7 
and H9. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2 shows the debt-to-capital models. Consistent with the previous table, the 
results show that there is a negative relationship between asset tangibility and capital-
structure, and a positive relationship between firm size and capital-structure. In addition, the 
results show that there is a negative relationship between firm profitability and capital-
structure. This result is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis, in which profitable 
firms prefer internal sources of funds rather than debt financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Booth et al., 2001). Interestingly, the sign of the market-to-book ratio (growth opportunities) 
is now negative and significant, which is consistent with the agency theory, in which firms 
with high growth opportunities will tend to have high related agency costs due to their 
flexibility in future alternative investment opportunities (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Finally, 
board size is found to be negatively related to capital-structure. This finding is not consistent 
with other empirical findings reported in Mehran (1992), Berger et al. (1997) and Abor and 
Biekpe (2005). Negative association between board size and corporate capital-structure 
decisions might indicate that board size and corporate capital-structure policy are substitute 
forms of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing agency costs. It also indicates that a 
larger board size creates pressures on managers to pursue lower debt-to-capital ratio to obtain 
good performance results (Wen et al., 2002) 
Based on the results in Table 2, the use of the debt-to-capital ratio model leads us to 
marginally accept H1 and H3 (as the coefficients estimates on ROCE and TANG are only 
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significant in some cases). We also accept H4; H5 and H9. The results in Table 2 lead us to 
reject H2; H6; H7 and H8. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 shows the debt-to-equity model. The results show that there is a negative 
relationship between firms’ risk and capital-structure, and hence firms with high risk will 
tend to have a higher risk of default and less access to debt financing; this result is consistent 
with bankruptcy theory of capital-structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). 
Consistent with Tables 1 and 2, the results show that there is a positive relationship between 
firm size and capital-structure. In addition, board size has a negative relationship with capital-
structure, which is consistent with Table 2. There is limited evidence of a negative 
relationship between market-to-book ratio and capital-structure; this result is found only in 
Model 1 and is consistent with the results in Table 2. The results also show that there is no 
significant relationship between asset uniqueness and cross holder shares. Hence, the study 
finds no support for the relationship between both asset uniqueness and cross holder shares 
and capital-structure. Finally, we find that the sign of the non-executive directors is negative, 
which contradicts the positive sign in Table 1 (Wen et al., 2002). This negative sign is 
explained in Wen et al. (2002: 76) as follows: “The outside directors monitor managers more 
actively, causing these managers to adopt lower leverage to avoid the performance pressure 
associated with commitments to disgorge large amounts of cash”.  
Insert Table 3 here 
In effect, our results show that capital-structure in UK firms can be determined by 
asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio, firm size, firm risk, firm profitability, non-executive 
directors and board size. The results show consistency in some variables across the different 
definitions of capital-structure (such as firm size). Other variables change according to the 
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definition of capital-structure (such as market-to-book ratio and non-executive directors). In 
addition, some variables appear only in one of the models (such as firm profitability and firm 
risk). This change can be explained by the different explanations of the selected capital-
structure index.  Hence, we argue that we introduce another dimension of the capital-structure 
puzzle, which is related to the selected definition of the capital-structure and the aim behind 
such a selection.  
5. Summary and overall discussion 
This paper aims at investigating capital-structure using UK data. Both fixed effects panel 
models and random effects tobit models are applied, using around 379 firms across the period 
from 1991 to 2002. Our results show that the capital-structure of UK firms follows the same 
determinates as suggested in previous literature; namely, capital-structure in UK firms can be 
determined by asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio, firm size, firm risk, firm profitability, 
non-executive directors and board size. In addition, our results show that changing the 
definition of capital-structure may result in changing the sign and the number of determinants 
that may affect the capital-structure decision. Hence, we argue that another dimension of the 
capital-structure can be introduced, which is related to the selected definition of capital-
structure used by various studies. It is worth noting that our aim is not to provide an optimal 
set of factors that may affect the decision of capital-structure, but to highlight the effect of the 
different definitions of capital-structure that can be used by different studies, which makes 
the comparison between such studies complicated or even flawed.  
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Table (1): Long term debt-to-equity ratio models 
 
Independent 
Variables 
fixed effects models tobit models 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Intercept -499.3458 -631.2851 -212.7555 -306.7389 
ROCE -.0306595 -.0284294 -.0308225 -.0311652 
BETA -4.780761 -10.99034 -10.32946 -14.79026 
Tang -165.202 -180.0296 -97.32207 -94.09438 
MB .4466117 .4054884 .4862467 .4646987 
SIZE 39.17235 55.87437 16.74955 29.90506 
UNIQ -.4467004 -.3668198 -.809226 -.3890572 
CHS .000015 .0000211 2.60e-07 8.95e-06 
NEXDR 28.20565  23.58943  
DRCTR  4.732761  2.465717 
Observations 3151 3219 3151 3219 
F-Value 6.69 6.79   
Wald chi2(8)   69.19 39.24 
Prob > chi2   0.0000 0.0000 
Values in bold are significant (p < 0.05). 
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Table (2): Debt-to-capital ratio models 
 
Independent 
Variables 
fixed effects models tobit models 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Intercept -275.7579 -257.1802 -111.7611 -114.0156 
ROCE -.0534979 -.0548005 -.0339691 -.035382 
BETA 7.785852 9.047373 3.668869 4.458918 
Tang -73.92528 -72.89856 -14.66566 -16.33828 
MB -.3317487 -.3320453 -.2636373 -.2673704 
SIZE 26.76834 26.51935 11.82764 13.62536 
UNIQ -.1002106 -.0885059 .0439886 .0640925 
CHS -7.82e-06 -8.02e-06 -5.21e-06 -4.73e-06 
NEXDR -2.831139  -.7106937  
DRCTR  -3.167784  -2.683009 
Observations 3147 3215 3147 3215 
F-Value 7.59 7.75   
Wald chi2(8)   45.31 51.12 
Prob > chi2   0.0000 0.0000 
Values in bold are significant (p < 0.10). 
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Table (3): Debt-to-equity ratio models 
 
Independent 
Variables 
fixed effects models tobit models 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Intercept -385.9759 -284.6684 -236.8958 -198.2588 
ROCE .0042651 -.0022339 -.0105555 -.0156764 
BETA -45.56159 -37.67888 -40.62063 -34.59983 
Tang 35.39766 35.75737 60.09314 53.58344 
MB .0963481 .1089498 .1101107 .1136026 
SIZE 43.72881 41.28024 29.72092 32.04565 
UNIQ -.1707511 -.1460124 -.1357217 -.2186945 
CHS -.0000203 -.0000221 -.0000208 -.000022 
NEXDR -20.85164  -16.4527  
DRCTR  -18.11002  -15.57895 
Observations 3022 3095 3022 3095 
F-Value 8.35 4.49   
Wald chi2(8)   26.23 35.51 
Prob > chi2   0.0010 0.0000 
Values in bold are significant (p < 0.10). 
